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Abstract
This paper examines real estate pricing featuring the price response curve, both theo-
retically and empirically. The Bertrand model with di¤erentiated products suggests that
the price response of real estate may di¤er when properties in the vicinity are priced by
an a¢ liated rm or ones own rm. This is because the rm can maintain the collusive
state if real estate prices in the neighborhood are priced by allies, whereas it loses it if
prices are priced by rivals. To examine this prediction, a spatial autoregressive model with
autoregressive and heteroskedastic disturbances, including a share of allies in the vicinity,
is estimated using data on the residential condominium market in central Tokyo. Empirical
results provide support for the model prediction.
JEL classication: C31, D21, D22, D43, L85, R31
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1 Introduction
Although real estate properties are di¤erentiated in a spatial dimension, real estate rms are
confronted with severe price competition against their neighbors. This implies that there is
essentially a prisoners dilemma at work for property prices. Real estate rms, however, may
avoid price competition when properties in the vicinity are priced by an a¢ liated rm or
ones own rm. In other words, rms can maintain a certain level of monopoly power in this
case. The reason is straightforward: such conditions may be similar to those arising from the
collusion or merger of oligopoly rms. The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical
model to test the above hypothesis using spatial statistical techniques.
Analysis of the strategic interaction among decision makers in the geographical space has
been a major issue in economics (Brueckner, 2001). Strategic interaction is described by the
reaction function: an individuals optimal choice depends on the optimal choice of agents in
close proximity. The spatial lag model is an appropriate empirical model to capture this idea.
In addition, the spatial lag model has considerable merit because it can examine endogeneity
within the reaction functions. Generally, it is quite di¢ cult to estimate the reaction functions,
because rivalschoice is endogenous. The spatial lag model potentially has the same problem.
Kelejian and Prucha (1998), however, suggested that the spatially lagged exogenous explana-
tory variables, which are the product of the spatial weights matrix and the other exogenous
explanatory variables, can be used as an appropriate set of instruments. That is, rivalscharac-
teristics and attributes expect to have an inuence on their decisions, but may be uncorrelated
with a rms own decision. Therefore, various studies have used a spatial lag model to capture
the strategic dependence among players. Examples of this from the literature include models
of tax competition among local municipalities (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Gérard, Jayet,
and Paty, 2010); spatial price competition in the retail gasoline market (Pinkse, Slade, and
Brett, 2002; Pennerstorfer, 2009); models of price interaction among local hospitals (Mobley,
2003; Mobley, Frech, and Anselin, 2009); strategic interaction among colleges in the choice of
tuition (McMillen, Singell, and Wadell, 2007); and so on.
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Several studies that estimate real estate price models have also used spatial statistical
techniques (Anselin, 1988; Can, 1990, 1992; Can and Megbolugbe, 1997). The spatial statistical
approach applied to housing prices has also been used to measure the benets of environmental
factors (Beron, Hanson, Murdoch, and Thayer, 2004; Kim, Phipps, and Anselin, 2003). These
papers have included the weighted average of selling prices for nearby properties to explain the
house prices. Why have the past studies considered spatial dependence? The reason is related
to the concepts of spatial dependence and housing submarkets. Because not all properties may
enter the choice sets of consumers, the housing market is generally subdivided (Palm, 1978;
Goodman and Thibodeau, 1998). Within housing submarkets, the selling prices of properties
are similar because submarkets contain close substitutes (Bourassa, Cantoni, and Hoesli, 2007;
Pryce and Evans, 2007). Housing submarkets thus have a spatial dependence on house prices
within the submarket. However, unlike the studies mentioned above that consider strategic
interdependence among players, the papers that use special statistical techniques have received
little attention in terms of strategy in the real estate industry.
In this paper, the Bertrand model with di¤erentiated products is applied to the real estate
industry to explain strategic interaction among rms in terms of real estate pricing. In this
stage, not only the price of rival rms, but also the price of a¢ liated companies or ones own
company, assume to have an impact on the pricing decisions of the rm (Bresnahan, 1987).
Theoretical results indicate that the real estate prices of a¢ liated rms in the neighborhood
have a tendency toward avoidance of price competition. Consequently, real estate rms can
charge high prices as in the case of a price cartel.1 The converse seems to also be true. That
is, local real estate markets tend to plunge into price competition when nearby properties are
priced by rival rms.2
In the empirical section, a database of residential sales in central Tokyo from 2005 to 2009 is
1Real estate rms can also maintain the price by limiting the supply of properties. For example, to avoid
large numbers of sales in one period, Japanese real estate companies frequently mark o¤ a period for selling a
property such as the rst sale period, the second sale period, and so on. This strategy may be e¤ective if there
are groups with demand functions of di¤erent elasticity. In this paper, however, we do not examine this type of
strategy.
2Based on a hedonic model with monopolistic competition, Chen, Clapp, and Tirtiroglu (2011) demonstrated
theoretically that a monopolistic real estate rm can set a price higher than marginal cost when the elasticity of
demand for housing units is decreasing with respect to size. Empirical results appear to support this hypothesis.
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used. Data for 599 condominiums were used for the analysis. The database is unique because it
contains the average sale price of units in each condominium, the location of the site, and also
the name of the rm that sells the property. Therefore, the data appear to identify whether
properties in the vicinity are provided by allies. Similar to previous studies, we attempt to test
for the presence of strategic interaction using a spatial lag model. The share of allies inside
submarkets is incorporated into the empirical model to capture the impact of pricing by the
rm or a¢ liated company.
The approach used in this paper is close to that used by Mobley, Frech, and Anselin (2009)
and Pennerstorfer (2009), which incorporated the degree of market competition into the spatial
lag model. Mobley, Frech, and Anselin (2009) examined the e¤ect of the HerndalHirshman
Index (HHI), dened over market shares of net patient revenue at the hospitals Health Facility
Planning Area in California, on hospital pricing. Their empirical results suggested that the
local market concentration increases net patient revenue for all hospitals. Pennerstorfer (2009)
considered the impact of the share of unbranded gasoline stations on the pricing of branded
stations in Lower Austria. He hypothesized that unbranded stations reduce price competition
among branded stations, because a large share of unbranded stations in a local market implies
little competition in the high-quality segment of the market. His empirical results supported
this hypothesis.
Because our model includes the nearby a¢ liated rms prices, the error terms should be
positively correlated. Therefore, a spatial error term is used. In addition, because real estate
prices are measured as averages, and they tend to depend on a location pattern, the error terms
are also heteroskedastic. Controlling the spatial error and allowing for heteroskedasticity, the
empirical results support our theoretical hypothesis: real estate rms are more likely to avoid
price competition when properties in the vicinity are priced by a¢ liated rms, while they
are more likely to compete on price when nearby properties are priced by rivals. Although
the actual shares of a¢ liated rms are far from the monopoly outcome, our empirical results
suggest that oligopolization in the spatial real estate market appears to induce a price increase.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents starts of residential
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condominium development in Tokyo. Section 3 constructs a theoretical model that formalizes
the intuition above. The data and empirical model used are discussed in Section 4, along with
the empirical results. Section 5 conducts several tests to check the robustness of the empirical
results. Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions.
2 Housing Starts in Tokyo
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) reports new housing
starts every month. There are four types of housing: custom-built detached houses, ready-built
houses, rental dwellings, and company-provided housing. Ready-built houses are divided into
two categories: condominium units and detached houses. The asking prices of condominium
units are easier to compare because condominium units are more standardized than detached
houses in Japan. In the empirical section, we thus use the prices of condominiums.
According to MLIT, the number of housing starts in Japan between 2005 and 2009 was
5,469,202. Of these, approximately 34.0% (1,860,254 units) were built in the Tokyo metropoli-
tan area, which includes Saitama, Tokyo, Chiba, and Kanagawa prefectures, and approximately
one quarter of the housing starts (474,531 units) were condominium units. The ratio in Tokyo
is much higher; approximately one third are condominiums, or 241,130 of the 775,729 units.
In the empirical section, we examine data from 2005 to 2009 in the 10 wards of central Tokyo:
Chiyoda, Chuo, Minato, Shinjuku, Shibuya, Bunkyo, Taito, Sumida, Koto, and Toshima wards.
The 10 wards of central Tokyo are selected by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. MLIT
reveals that of the 198,920 housing starts, approximately 45.1% (89,797 units) are classied as
condominiums.
The Japan Fair Trade Commission reports the degree of market competition using the
HHI. In the report, however, there is no description in relation to sales agents of condominium
buildings.3 This suggests that the condominium market is not oligopolistic.4 On the other
3According to industrial classications, used in the 2006 Establishment and Enterprise Census (EES) issued
by The Statistics Bureau and the Director-General for Policy Planning of Japan, real estate rms that sell
condominiums are classied into Sales agents of buildings and houses and land subdividers and developers.
The 2006 EES reveals that the number of establishments in this group in Japan is 18,010.
4Beck, Scott, and Yelowitz (2012) also demonstrated the HHI is su¢ ciently small in medium and large
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hand, the Real Estate Economic Institute (REEI) reported the market share of the top 20 rms
in all of Japan. The share is calculated as the percentage of new condominiums that are built
by real estate companies. According to the REEI, this gure in 2010 is 55.9%; namely, the
average share of the 20 top-ranking rms is approximately 2.8%. The REEI also reports that
oligopolization in the Japanese condominium market has been increasing. To our knowledge,
there is no report on the degree of market competition in the Tokyo condominium market.
3 The Bertrand Price-Setting Model
Real estate properties are generally di¤erentiated in a spatial dimension. At the same time,
real estate rms compete on price within spatial submarkets, because properties are close
substitutes. In this sense, the Bertrand model with di¤erentiated products is relevant to the
real estate market.
Assume there are two properties i and j (i; j = 1; 2, and i 6= j) in a local housing market.
Let us denote demand for a property i, hi. The demand function depends on the own-price
pi, a vector of housing traits Xi, and the rivals price pj , which is weighted by a given W :
hi = hi(pi;Wpj ;Xi). The weight, W , represents the degree of similarity between properties
and takes a large value when the rival property is similar to the own property. In our context,
W captures the spatial dimension in the local housing market. For example, within spatial
submarkets, properties that are relatively close to the own dwelling are more likely to have
an impact on the own-price. In this case, W is large. Assume that the demand for property
follows the law of demand: the demand hi falls when the own-price pi rises. Assume also that
properties are gross substitutes. These assumptions imply that @hi=@pi < 0 and @hi=@pj =
W (@hi=@Pj) > 0, where Pj = Wpj . Both properties have identical average and marginal
construction costs; namely, the cost of producing output hi is assumed to be a linear function
chi, where c is a positive constant. The prot from the property i then becomes:
i = pihi(pi;Wpj ;Xi)  chi(pi;Wpj ;Xi) + i [pjhj(pi;Wpj ;Xj)  chj(pi;Wpj ;Xj)] ;
residential real estate brokerage markets in the US.
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where i is a parameter registering the strength of the alliance. If a rm that supplies property
i considers a rm that supplies property j as the rival, then i = 0, whereas if property is
rm considers property js rm as an ally, then i = 1. The former case is a general case in
the Bertrand model: property is supplier only pursues its own self-interest when deciding the
property price. On the other hand, in the latter case, property is supplier takes into account
the level of interest in property j, because property js supplier is the ally. We treat i as the
continuous variable, which ranges from zero to one, because it allows us to di¤erentiate the
prot function. Actually, the share of the allys properties is a proxy for the strength of the
alliance in the empirical section.
Both suppliers of properties have pure strategies in price. That is, given pj , i, Xi, and
Xj , property is supplier chooses the own-price to maximize the prot from the property i.
Suppose that the demand function is linear (Mobley, 2003). Under this assumption, @2hi=@p2i ,
@2hi=@pi@pj =W (@
2hi=@pi@Pj), @2hi=@pi@xi are equal to zero, where xi is one of the elements
in Xi. The reaction function for property i is then dened by:
pi = pi(Wpj ; i;Xi); (1)
where
@pi
@pj
=  @
2i=@pi@pj
@2i=@p2i
=  @hi=@pj + i(@hj=@pi)
2(@hi=@pi)
> 0 (2)
@pi
@i
=  @
2i=@pi@i
@2i=@p2i
=  (pj   c) @hj=@pi
2(@hi=@pi)
> 0 (3)
@pi
@xi
=  @
2i=@pi@xi
@2i=@p2i
=   @hi=@xi
2(@hi=@pi)
: (4)
Note that all denominators on the right-hand side in Eqs (2), (3), and (4) are negative, because
the demand function follows the law of demand.
First, Eq. (2) attempts to calculate the slope of property is reaction function with respect
to the given rivals price: the impact of exogenous changes in the rivals price, all else being
equal, on the own-price. Because products are assumed substitutes, the reaction function is
positively sloped.
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Second, Eq. (3) focuses of the main relationship examined in this paper. Bertrand rms can
charge prices above marginal cost when their products are di¤erentiated; thus, pj in Eq. (3)
is larger than c. When property j is a rival of property i, and only property is supplier raises
the selling price of their property, property is supplier loses some prots, because properties
are substitutes. Eq. (3), however, suggests that property is supplier can internalize the prot
(pj   c), when property j is priced by the ally. Consequently, the sign of @pi=@i becomes
positive. Property is rm aggressively raises its own-price in the case where it considers
property j as an ally.
Last, Eq. (4) suggests that the sign of @pi=@xi depends on the sign of @hi=@xi. For example,
consider the case where the sign of @hi=@xi is positive. This case implies that property i attracts
demand by providing a high-quality attribute; thereby, the rm raises the own-price.
A Bertrand equilibrium with di¤erentiated products in the real estate market is described
by the intersection of the reaction functions. We denote the equilibrium price as:
pi = p

i (i;Xi; j ;Xj):
One of objectives of this paper is to examine the e¤ect of i on the property price. We can
calculate this e¤ect as follows:
@pi
@i|{z}
indirect
=
1
(1  )| {z }
multiplier
@pi
@i|{z}
direct
> 0; (5)
where
 =

 @
2i=@pi@pj
@2i=@p2i
 
 @
2j=@pj@pi
@2j=@p2j
!
2 (0; 1):
Note that the formula in the rst set of parentheses on the right-hand side is the slope of
property is reaction function (see Eq. (2)), while that in the second set of parentheses is the
slope of property js reaction function.
The direct e¤ect, as it was labeled by Small and Steimetz (2007), in Eq. (5) corresponds
to Eq. (3). That is, when property is supplier assumes that property j is priced by the ally,
property is supplier raises its own propertys price, given price pj . However, property js
supplier raises pj in reaction to this increase, because property js reaction function is also
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positively sloped. Then property is supplier again raises its own propertys price; namely, pi
increases more than the direct e¤ect in the equilibrium. This additional impact is described
by a multiplier e¤ect in Eq. (5). The direct e¤ect multiplied by the multiplier e¤ect is called
the indirect e¤ect (Small and Steimetz, 2007). In the nal analysis, property is supplier can
avoid price competition in equilibrium when property j is priced by the ally.
Conversely, local real estate markets tend to fall into price competition when property is
supplier knows that property j is priced by its rival (i ! 0). That is, there is essentially a
prisoners dilemma at work in the pricing of properties.
4 The Econometric Spatial Lag Model of Real Estate Pricing
4.1 The empirical model
In this empirical section, the reaction function can be represented in matrix notation. A
spatially lagged dependent variable is incorporated into the empirical model to estimate the
sale price of property. On the one hand, the spatial lag model is used to explain house prices,
because the variation in the sales price of property has a spatial component: the price of a
property is related to the prices of adjacent properties. The spatial lag model is one of the
methods used to take into account the inuence of spatial submarkets. On the other hand,
the spatial lag model is appropriate for capturing the characteristics of reaction functions used
in our theoretical model, because the selling price of property depends on the prices of other
properties in a local real estate market.
The spatially lagged dependent variable is represented asWp, whereW is a NN spatial
weights matrix, N is the number of observations, and p = (p1; p2;    ; pK)0 is a vector of
the prices of property i to be estimated. By convention, the diagonal elements of the spatial
weights matrix are set to zero and row elements are standardized such that they sum to one
for all types. The structure of spatial weights matrixes depends on how we dene the spatial
submarkets, which is discussed below. To apply the reaction function in equation (1) to the
data, the following linear estimable form of a spatial lag model is specied:
p = Wp+  +X + ; (6)
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where  is the parameter for the spatial lag that captures spatial interaction, X is the matrix
of housing attributes that has a parameter vector , and the error term vector  is assumed to
be homoskedastic, independent, and identical across observations. The estimate of the spatial
lag parameter reects the slope of the reaction function. The Bertrand model suggests that
the sign of  is positive. On the other hand, the estimated parameters of housing attributes,
which are included in the vector X, are variables that can shift the reaction function. The
vector  = (1; 2;    ; N )0 reects the strength of allies within spatial submarkets, which
links to the spatial weights matrix. The parameter  appears to capture our main hypotheses.
It suggests that the sign of  is positive. The variable  is discussed later.
Equation (6) has an endogeneity issue: the prices of rivals,Wp, are jointly determined. As
in Mobley (2003), Mobley, Frech, and Anselin (2009), and Pennerstorfer (2009), we can obtain
the reduced form of Eq. (6). Instrumental variables techniques are used to estimate Eq. (6),
using the matrix of instruments that is formed as a subset of linearly independent columns of
(Z,WZ,W2Z), where Z = (;X). These instruments are proposed by previous studies such
as Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 2010).5
So far,  is assumed to be homoskedastic, independent, and identical across observations.
There are, however, two potentially problematic assumptions for the error term. First, if there
are any spatially dependent omitted variables, the assumption of independence tends to be
violated. This is likely to occur because our model includes the nearby allys prices. Second,
because we only obtain an average selling price of apartments in a building, the error term
is more likely to be heteroskedastic. To consider these two issues, we specify the error term
as following a rst-order spatial autoregressive error process:  = W + u, where  is the
spatial autoregressive error parameter, and u is an uncorrected but heteroskedastic error term.
Because our data are averages, the variance of u is assumed to depend on the number of units in
the apartment building (ni). In addition to this, u tends to become heteroskedastic because of
the unobserved spatial heterogeneity (Anselin, 1988). Because the variance of u is determined
by several factors, the unknown skedastic function of u is assumed. When both the spatial lag
5When the demand function is linear, as assumed in the previous section, property prices do not depend on
rivalscharacteristics.
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and error terms must be considered, a generalized spatial two-stage least squares (GS2SLS)
procedure is used to estimate the spatial lag model with the spatial error term, while allowing
for unknown heteroskedasticity in the disturbance term (Kelejian and Prucha, 2010).
4.2 The data
The data for this paper were collected by Marketing Research Center (MRC). MRC is a limited
liability company, with the head o¢ ce in Tokyo, Japan. MRC conducts research, collects and
analyzes real estate data, and prepares articles and reports its ndings.6 The database contains
the average (asking) price of newly constructed condominiums in the Tokyo metropolitan area.
That is, we can observe the average price data of properties for each condominium. The
database also includes housing attributes and the name of the company that constructs the
condominium. In addition, this database includes not only the address of the apartment, but
also the exact location, dened by longitude and latitude using the world geodetic system.
Therefore, the database is appropriate for examining our theoretical hypothesis using a spatial
econometric model. To repeat, we use data from 2005 to 2009 in the 10 wards of central Tokyo.
The sample used in the analysis has the following characteristics. The number of obser-
vations in Tokyo in the full period is 3,102. Of these, 23.6% (731 observations) are built in
the 10 wards of central Tokyo, which is 13.7% lower than the value from MLIT. Restricting
the sample to those for which all necessary information was available reduced the number of
observations to 709. Of these 709, 15.5% (110 observations) were produced by joint ventures
(JV), which is when a group of rms build one condominium. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3, the
observations related to JV are removed from the sample, and so the sample is reduced to 599
observations. In Section 5.2, however, the observations related to JV are added.
Table 1 presents the variable denitions for both the dependent and explanatory variables,
followed by Table 2 with sample statistics.
To construct the variable lag price (Wp) in Table 1, we draw a circle with a y-kilometer
radius, and dene this space as the spatial submarket of dwellings. All condominiums that are
6Details about MRC are available at http://www.mrc1969.com/ (accessed on April 27, 2011).
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observed within a y-kilometer radius are assumed to obtain the i-th row ofW. To check robust-
ness, circles with a 2-kilometer (approximately 1.2 mile) radius, 4-kilometer (approximately
2.5 mile) radius, and 8-kilometer (approximately 12.9 mile) radius are reported. Generally,
the further the properties are from the center, the less intense is the competition among them.
Taking into account this matter, the spatial weights matrix is based on the inverse of the
distances between properties. As mentioned, the database provides information on the rms
name. There are 122 rms. When a property is produced by ones own rm or an a¢ liated
company, we dene it as an ally. We calculate the market share and the average share of the
20 top-ranked rms in the central Tokyo area over the full sample period, which is the same
as the denition by the REEI in Section 2. These values are respectively 72.0% and 3.6%,
which are respectively 16.1 and 0.8 points higher than that of the REEI.
In this paper, we create the following two types of alliance strength to examine our hypoth-
esis. The rst type is a share that is based on the number of observations in the submarkets.
If there are Ni properties in the submarkets of property i, and ai of them are priced by the
ally, then the share (Ally 1) will be:
1i =
ai
Ni
:
When there are no allies in the vicinity, 1i takes the value zero (0%), while when all neighbor
dwellings are provided by allies, 1i takes the value 1 (100%). Table 2 and Fig. 1 demonstrate
that the narrower the market is dened, the more likely that a rm has market power.
The second type is a share that is based on (expected) revenue. Let pAj (p
R
j ) be the average
price of property j (j 6= i) that is priced by allies (rivals) in the submarkets, and nAj (nRj ) be
the number of units in the condominium building. Then the revenue share (Ally 2) will be:
2i =
P
nAj p
A
jP
nAj p
A
j +
P
nRj p
R
j
:
Table 2 demonstrates that the values of Ally 2 are quite similar to Ally 1.
The following structural attributes of the condominium units are controlled for in the
estimation; namely, average living area, the number of rooms, the condominium density, the
number of elevators divided by the total oor space of the condominium, the construction
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material, the height of the condominium, and the number of units in the condominium.
To control for the neighborhood of the condominiums, distance to the nearest railway
station is included. Although not reported in Table 2, we also add 13 train line dummies in-
cluding four Japan Railway lines and nine Tokyo Metro subway lines, 10 geographical dummies
comprising 10 Tokyo wards, and seven zoning code dummies. Unobservable neighborhood char-
acteristics apart from these variables are controlled for using the spatial autoregressive error
terms.
In addition to geographical categories, four year dummies for 2006 to 2009 are included,
but are not reported in Table 2.
In the estimation stage, we take the logarithm of the variables price, lag price, and living
area.
4.3 Estimation results
Table 3 presents the estimated results, which use the rst type of share index (Ally 1). Table
3 also reports diagnostic tests based on the residuals obtained from the OLS model without
lag price. The results of Morans I indicate that spatial autocorrelation is present, regardless
of the weight specications. Therefore, both the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test statistic and
its robust version are calculated to specify the estimated model (Florax, Folmer, and Rey,
2003). First, the LM lag and the LM error indicate that both the spatial lag and the spatial
error coe¢ cients are signicantly di¤erent from zero in all cases. Therefore, we next carry out
robust Lagrange multiplier tests to distinguish between the spatial lag and the spatial error
models. However, both the robust LM lag and its error remain highly signicant. This implies
that a spatial model containing both a spatial lag of the dependent variable and spatially
autoregressive disturbances must be considered. Thus, Table 3 demonstrates the empirical
results of the reaction function by means of GS2SLS.
Moreover, heteroskedasticity tests for the OLS residuals are conducted, such as the mod-
ied Glejser (MS) tests, which are proposed by Machado and Santos Silva (2000), and Im
tests, which are proposed by Im (2000). Both of these tests are robust under weak assump-
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tions of the disturbances. As mentioned in Section 4.1, to conduct these tests, we use the
variables that tend to be related to the heteroskedasticity, such as the number of units in the
apartment building and the location of the building. The number of units is used because the
error term appears to be heteroskedastic from averaging the dependent variable. The latitude
and longitude, which indicate the location of the apartment building, are used to capture het-
eroskedasticity caused by spatial heterogeneity. Therefore, these statistics follow a chi-squared
distribution with three degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. As
shown in Table 3, they are all signicant and the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is re-
jected. Normality tests are also conducted, such as JB tests, which are proposed by Jarque
and Bera (1987), and adjusted JB tests, proposed by Urzúa (1996). These statistics follow
chi-squared distributions with two degrees of freedom. They are signicant, as indicated in
Table 3, and the null hypothesis of normality is also rejected. Both the heteroskedasticity and
normality tests indicate that disturbances follow nonnormal distributions and their variances
are heteroskedastic; consequently, we must also consider these issues.
To estimate the model under nonnormality, Kelejian and Prucha (1998) proposed the IV
estimation approach. If, however, the disturbances are heteroskedastic, the asymptotic dis-
tribution of the Kelejian and Prucha estimator is not appropriate. Kelejian and Prucha
(2010) developed an estimator that allows for heteroskedastic disturbances. They proposed
a robust variance and covariance matrix estimator under the assumption of heteroskedastic
disturbances.
Considering the spatial autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the disturbances, we esti-
mate the model using the Kelejian and Prucha (2010) method. From the estimation results of
this method, shown in Table 3, where the signs of the coe¢ cients are the same across the three
specications of the spatial weights matrix although they are of di¤erent size, the hypothesis
that a spatial error is not present is rejected at the 1% signicance level. After considering
the spatial error, the coe¢ cient for the pricing of properties in the closest-neighbors area has a
statistically signicant positive impact on the real estate price. As suggested in the theoretical
section, the reaction function has a positive slope.
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Furthermore, a higher share of allies leads to higher selling prices of real estate property,
indicated by the signicantly positive sign of the variable Ally 1. These results suggest that real
estate rms tend to avoid price competition in equilibrium when their submarkets share is high.
Our hypothesis is supported by the empirical results. At the same time, the empirical results
imply that a prisoners dilemma is likely to exist in equilibrium. When rivals decrease the
selling prices of properties, but a real estate rm does not, the real estate rm loses customers;
thereby, the real estate rms also have a tendency to decrease selling prices.
We can calculate how an increase in the share in the spatial submarkets raises the selling
price of property in the equilibrium, using the estimation results. Let us measure the elasticity
of propertiesprice to 1i . Following Kim, Phipps, and Anselin (2003), this can be written as:
@dln pi
@1i| {z }
indirect
=
1
(1  ^)| {z }
spatial multiplier
^|{z}
direct
;
where dln pi is the equilibrium tted value of a property i, and ^ and ^ are the estimated
value.7 Kim, Phipps, and Anselin (2003) called (1   ^) 1 a spatial multiplier. In case the of
the 2-kilometer radius, for example, a 1% increase in the share increases property prices by
0.29%. The indirect e¤ect tends to be inelastic, because the value of the direct e¤ect is quite
small. Why is the direct e¤ect so small? To understand this, let us rewrite the direct e¤ect of
Eq. (3) so that it depends on the ratio of the price elasticity, as follows:
@pi
@i
=  (pj   c)hj
2hi

ji
ii

;
where ii is the own-price elasticity of demand for property i, and ji is the cross-price elas-
ticity of demand for property j with respect to pi. On the one hand, ii may be elastic for
the following two reasons. First, because the share is substantially low, when the supplier of
property i increases the price, buyers can choose substitute properties provided by rival rms
within the housing submarkets. Second, buyers also search for properties outside spatial hous-
ing submarkets when we consider a short radius. On the other hand, ji tends to be relatively
smaller than ii. Similar to the above, we can interpret this in two ways. First, when the
7This corresponds to the average total impact suggested in LeSage and Pace (2009, p. 37).
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supplier of property i increases the price, rival properties inside the housing submarkets may
capture buyers who no longer wish to purchase property i. To repeat, however, because each
property accounts for only a small share, attracting customers away from property i might
be rather di¢ cult. Second, rival properties inside the housing submarkets may further fail to
attract customers away from property i when buyers also search for properties outside spatial
housing submarkets. These two reasons have a tendency to produce a relatively small elasticity.
To sum up, the ratio of the price elasticity (ji=ii) becomes small. The share of allies thus
has a smaller impact on the selling prices of properties in the case of the 2-kilometer radius.
Expanding the size of the circle of submarkets, however, results in larger values of the
indirect e¤ect, because the direct e¤ects are larger than in the previous case. The values of the
indirect e¤ect are, respectively, 1.11% in the case of the 4-kilometer radius and 1.70% in the
case of the 8-kilometer radius. In sum, the larger the spatial submarkets are dened, the greater
the elasticity of price. Why do the direct e¤ects become larger as the radius increases? Let
us again consider the ratio of the price elasticity (ji=ii). Interestingly, Table 2 suggests that
the wider the market is dened, the smaller the average shares of allies. For this rst reason,
buyers can readily nd substitute properties within the housing submarkets. The rst reason
increases ii, yet decreases ji. However, a second reason suggests that buyers face di¢ culty in
searching for dwellings outside spatial housing submarkets (e.g., because of workplace access)
when we consider a larger radius. That is, the impact of the second reason may be weaker,
resulting in a lower ii, and a larger ji. If this weakened second reason outweighs the rst
reason, ii eventually decreases, whereas ji increases. As a result, real estate rms e¤ectively
raise the selling price of properties. This might be the reason for the elastic impact of the
allys share.
Table 4 presents the estimation results, which use the second type of share index (Ally 2).
It indicates that the results are similar to those in Table 3.
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5 Robustness Checks
The empirical results provide support for the model predictions. In this section, we conduct
several tests to see whether these results are robust.
5.1 Changing the denition of the spatial weights matrix
In the empirical model, we assume that real estate rms only consider properties that are
built in close proximity to their rivals. Therefore, all properties that are observed within a
y-kilometer radius are included in the spatial weights matrix. One concern is that real estate
rms may not consider properties that are built in di¤erent years to that of rivalsproperties.
To deal with this issue, the elements of the spatial weights matrix are set equal to 0 if properties
are priced in di¤erent years.
Only the main variables are reported in Table 5, because the signs of the coe¢ cients are the
same as those in Tables 3 and 4. The rst column (the 2-kilometer radius case) indicates that
the coe¢ cient of the lag price is statistically insignicant. This may reect the fact that the
average number of properties in the spatial submarkets is quite small, when we only consider
the specic year. The second and third columns, however, indicate that the property prices
have a statistically signicant positive impact on the real estate price, suggesting a positive
slope of the reaction function in the 4- and 8-kilometer radius cases. Ally 1 in the rst and
second columns tends to have high standard errors; however, the shares of both types of allies
are positive and signicant. These results are consistent with the prediction of the model.
5.2 Sample addition
Now the observation supplied by JV is added to the sample. However, we only consider the
names of rms listed rst, because generally the rst rm in the list contributes the largest
amount to an investment to build a condominium. For example, suppose that JV comprise
three real estate rms that are listed as C Buildings, A Real Estate Development, and B Estate.
Then we assume that a condominium is built by C Buildings.
Although Ally 1 in column 1 is insignicant in Table 6, our hypothesis seems to be valid
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even though we include the observation supplied by JV.
We also regard JV as independent suppliers. For example, suppose there were JV where C
Buildings is listed rst. Then we assume that a condominium is built by C Buildings JV. The
results are reported in Table 7, indicating that the coe¢ cients of interest were similar.
There are, however, two other items of note in relation to JV. First, we only consider two
denitions of JV. Second, JV are a strategy of real estate rms. If real estate rms may avoid
price competition through establishing JV, they tend to do so. Therefore, JV must be an
endogenous variable. These two issues are deferred to future research.
6 Conclusion
The strategic pricing of real estate properties has not been researched extensively. As a result,
little is known about the impact of market concentration on property prices in localized housing
markets. This paper examined whether real estate rms can avoid price competition when
nearby properties are priced by an a¢ liated rm or ones own rm. In the theoretical section,
a Bertrand model with di¤erentiated products was applied to real estate markets. A price
response function that depends on the rivals price and the strength (share) of allies was
obtained from this model. Comparative statics suggest that real estate rms can sustain the
collusive state if real estate prices in the neighborhood are priced by allies. The collusive
state and the competitive state were empirically distinguished, adding the share of allies into
the spatial lag model. The spatial weight matrix was linked to spatial housing submarkets.
That is, we constructed a circle around each property, and dened this space as the spatial
submarkets of dwelling. In the estimation stage, we considered cases of 2-, 4-, and 8-kilometer
radiuses in the 10 wards of central Tokyo. After controlling the spatial and heteroskedastic
error terms, our empirical results indicated that real estate rms can raise the selling price of
properties when their shares in the local market increase. Specically, the elasticity of selling
prices to the share are greater than 1 in the cases of 4- and 8-kilometer radiuses.
Our empirical results may suggest that customers face a serious problem. Because an
expenditure to acquire a house is frequently high, even a small percent increase in price hits
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buyerspockets. Accordingly, policy makers may monitor the share of the real estate company
in spatial submarkets to maintain price competition.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Arnab Bhattacharjee, Seung-Young Jeong, Koji Karato, Mark
Lijesen, Takanori Nakade, and Mitsuru Ota for their helpful comments, as well as participants
in seminar at Keio University, and the University of Tokyo and conferences at ARSC in Toyama,
AsRES in Jeju, ENHR in Vienna, and RSAI in Miami for their valuable comments. We are also
grateful to Marketing Research Center for access to microdata. This research was supported
by The Association of Real Estate Agents of Japan (Fudosan Ryutsu Keiei Kyokai).
19
References
Anselin, L. 1988. Spatial Econometrics: Methods and Models. Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Boston.
Beck, J., Scott, F., and Yelowitz, A. 2012. Concentration and market structure in local real
estate markets. Real Estate Economics: forthcoming.
Beron, K.J., Hanson, Y., Murdoch, J.C., and Thayer, M.A. 2004. Hedonic price functions
and spatial dependence: Implications for the demand for urban air quality, in: Anselin,
L., Florax, R.J.G.M., and Ray, S.J. (Eds.), Advances in Spatial Econometrics, Springer-
Verlag, Berlin.
Bourassa, S.C., Cantoni, E., and Hoesli, M. 2007. Spatial dependence, housing submarkets,
and house price prediction. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 35 (2):
143160.
Bresnahan, T.F. 1987. Competition and collusion in the American automobile industry: The
1955 price war. Journal of Industrial Economics, 35 (4): 457482.
Brueckner, J.K. 2001. Strategic interaction and spatial econometrics. Paper presented at
Center for Spatially Integrated Social Sciences (CSISS) Specialist Meeting on Spatial
Externalities, 2001, Santa Barbara, CA.
Brueckner, J.K., and Saavedra, L.A. 2001. Do local governments engage in strategic property-
tax competition? National Tax Journal, 54 (2): 203230.
Can, A. 1990. The measurement of neighborhood dynamics in urban house prices. Economic
Geography, 66 (3): 254272.
Can, A. 1992. Specication and estimation of hedonic housing price models. Regional Science
and Urban Economics, 22 (3): 453474.
Can, A., and Megbolugbe, I. 1997. Spatial dependence and house price index construction.
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 14 (1/2): 203222.
20
Chen, Y., Clapp, J.M., and Tirtiroglu, U. 2011. Hedonic estimation of housing demand
elasticity with a markup over marginal costs. Journal of Housing Economics, 20 (4):
233248.
Florax, R.J.G.M, Folmer, H., and Rey, S.J. 2003. Specication searches in spatial economet-
rics: The relevance of Hendrys methodology. Regional Science and Urban Economics 33
(5): 557579
Gérard, M., Jayet, H., and Paty, S. 2010. Tax interactions among Belgian municipalities:
Do interregional di¤erences matter? Regional Science and Urban Economics, 33 (4):
489516.
Goodman, A.C., and Thibodeau, T.G. 1998. Housing market segmentation. Journal of
Housing Economics, 7 (2): 121143.
Im, K.S. 2000. Robustifying Glejser test of heteroskedasticity. Journal of Econometrics, 97
(1): 179188.
Jarque, C.M., and Bera, A.K. 1987. A test for normality of observations and regression
residuals. International Statistical Review, 55 (2): 163172.
Kelejian, H.H., and Prucha, I.R. 1998. A generalized spatial two-stage least squares procedure
for estimating a spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances. Journal
of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 17 (1): 99121.
Kelejian, H.H., and Prucha, I.R. 2010. Specication and estimation of spatial autoregressive
models with autoregressive and heteroskedastic disturbances. Journal of Econometrics,
157 (1): 5367.
Kim, C.W., Phipps, T.T, and Anselin, L. 2003. Measuring the benets of air quality improve-
ment: A spatial hedonic approach. Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment, 45 (1): 2439.
21
LeSage, J.P., and Pace, R.K. 2009. Introduction to Spatial Econometrics, CRC Press, Boca
Raton, FL.
Machado, J.A.F., and Santos Silva, J.M.C. 2000. Glejsers test revisited. Journal of Econo-
metrics, 97 (1): 189202.
McMillen, D.P., Singell, L.D. Jr., and Wadell, G.R. 2007. Spatial competition and the price
of college. Economic Inquiry, 45 (4): 817833.
Mobley, L.R. 2003. Estimating hospital market pricing: An equilibrium approach using
spatial econometrics. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 40 (5): 336342.
Mobley, L.R., Frech, H.E., and Anselin, L. 2009. Spatial interaction, spatial multipliers and
hospital competition. International Journal of the Economics and Business, 16 (1): 117.
Palm, R. 1978. Spatial segmentation of the urban housing market. Economic Geography, 54
(3): 210221.
Pennerstorfer, D. 2009. Spatial price competition in retail gasoline markets: Evidence from
Austria. Annals of Regional Science, 43 (1): 133158.
Pinkse, J., Slade M.E., and Brett, C. 2002. Spatial price competition: A semiparametric
approach, Econometrica, 70 (3): 11111153.
Pryce, G., and Evans, G. 2007. Identifying submarkets at the sub-regional level in England.
Department of Communities and Local Government, London.
Small, K.A., and Steimetz, S. 2007. Spatial hedonics and the willingness to pay for residential
amenities. Economics working paper no. 05-06-31, University of California, Irvine, CA.
Urzúa, C.M. 1996. On the correct use of omnibus test for normality. Economics Letters, 53
(3): 247251.
22
Table 1. Denition of the variables.
Variable Denition
Price The average selling price of a property, ten thousand yen
Lag price The average selling price of a neighbors property weighted by the spatial
weight matrix
Ally 1 The ratio of properties sold by ally within submarkets, percentage
Ally 2 The ratio of total revenue sold by ally within submarkets, percentage
Living area Average oor space of living room, square meters
One room A binary variable indicating the mode number of unit rooms in a con-
dominium is one bedroom and a living room
Two rooms A binary variable indicating the mode number of unit rooms in a con-
dominium is two bedrooms and a living room
Three rooms A binary variable indicating the mode number of unit rooms in a con-
dominium is three bedrooms and a living room
FAR Floor area ratio, percentage
Elevator The number of elevators divided by oor area, percentage
SRC A binary variable indicating a building whose main frames are made of
steel-reinforced concrete
Skyscraper A binary variable indicating a condominium is high-rise (20-story or
more building)
Large scale A binary variable indicating a condominium is large scale (200 or more
units)
Distance Distance to the nearest station, minutes
Train line Thirteen binary variables indicating a condominium is located on one of
the train lines
Ward Ten binary variables indicating a condominium is located in one of the
wards
Zoning Seven binary variables indicating a condominium is located in the zoning
code
Year Four binary variables indicating a condominium was sold between 2006
and 2009
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables.
Variable  Mean Median  Std. Dev.  Max.  Min.
Price (ten thousand yen) 5932.76 4417.60 5420.48 43250.00 1851.80
Ally 1 (2km, percent) 5.31 3.33 5.95 30.43 0.00
Ally 1 (4km, percent) 3.24 2.30 3.38 17.42 0.00
Ally 1 (8km, percent) 2.37 1.94 2.24 10.85 0.00
Ally 2 (2km, percent) 7.22 4.09 8.10 49.78 0.22
Ally 2 (4km, percent) 4.14 2.35 4.87 26.70 0.08
Ally 2 (8km, percent) 2.90 1.65 3.26 15.11 0.03
Living area (m2) 59.17 58.39 25.21 196.69 20.12
One room (dummy) 0.37 0.48 1.00 0.00
Two rooms (dummy) 0.30 0.46 1.00 0.00
Three rooms (dummy) 0.33 0.47 1.00 0.00
FAR  (percent) 438.12 400.00 162.27 960.00 143.87
Elevator (number/total floor area) 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.33 0.00
SRC (dummy) 0.12 0.32 1.00 0.00
Other frame (dummy) 0.88 0.32 1.00 0.00
Skyscraper (dummy) 0.07 0.25 1.00 0.00
Large-scale (dummy) 0.06 0.24 1.00 0.00
Distance (minutes) 5.65 5.00 3.44 17.00 1.00
Observations 599
Dependent variable = log of Price
2km 4km 8km
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Lag price 0.269 *** 0.045 0.314 *** 0.050 0.279 *** 0.066
Ally 1 0.002 *** 0.001 0.008 *** 0.002 0.012 *** 0.003
Living area 1.001 *** 0.032 1.019 *** 0.033 1.044 *** 0.035
One room 0.058 ** 0.024 0.073 *** 0.024 0.079 *** 0.026
Two rooms 0.015 0.019 0.029 0.019 0.035 * 0.020
Three rooms (reference) (reference) (reference)
FAR (×1000) 0.012 0.085 0.026 0.085 0.003 0.089
Elevator 0.661 ** 0.324 0.664 ** 0.310 0.703 ** 0.339
SRC −0.009 0.021 −0.012 0.022 −0.009 0.024
Skyscraper 0.068 0.045 0.067 0.045 0.062 0.046
Large-scale −0.005 0.045 −0.009 0.045 −0.014 0.047
Distance −0.010 *** 0.003 −0.010 *** 0.003 −0.010 *** 0.003
Constant 2.377 *** 0.455 1.870 *** 0.487 2.084 *** 0.614
Lag error 0.369 *** 0.095 0.381 *** 0.107 0.451 *** 0.116
Ward Yes Yes Yes
Train line Yes Yes Yes
Zoning Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Observations 599 599 599
Misspecification tests based on the OLS regression without Lag price
Spatial dependence tests Statistics P -value Statistics P -value Statistics P -value
LM lag 164.28 0.000 140.90 0.000 92.31 0.000
LM error 55.95 0.000 50.49 0.000 29.02 0.000
Robust LM lag 146.06 0.000 115.31 0.000 87.91 0.000
Robust LM error 37.74 0.000 24.90 0.000 24.62 0.000
Moran's I 9.20 0.000 8.61 0.000 7.87 0.000
Heteroskedastticity tests Statistics P -value Statistics P -value Statistics P -value
MS 24.38 0.000 24.34 0.000 24.61 0.000
Im 20.27 0.000 22.15 0.000 24.32 0.000
Normality tests Statistics P -value Statistics P -value Statistics P -value
Skewness 0.43 0.48 0.47
Kurtosis 3.65 3.54 3.54
JB 29.13 0.000 30.43 0.000 29.47 0.000
Adj JB 29.92 0.000 31.13 0.000 30.16 0.000
Table 3. Estimation results based on the share of allies (Ally 1).
Average number of the condominiums in the submarket: 56.7 in 2km; 176.9 in 4km; 437.8 in 8km. 
Note: ***, **, * indicate significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Dependent variable = log of Price
2km 4km 8km
Variables Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Lag price 0.268 *** 0.045 0.314 *** 0.050 0.276 *** 0.064
Ally 2 0.003 *** 0.001 0.008 *** 0.002 0.012 *** 0.003
Living area 0.999 *** 0.032 1.019 *** 0.033 1.033 *** 0.035
One room 0.059 ** 0.024 0.073 *** 0.024 0.083 *** 0.026
Two rooms 0.016 0.019 0.029 0.019 0.039 ** 0.020
Three rooms (reference) (reference) (reference)
FAR (×1000) 0.010 0.085 0.028 0.086 0.004 0.088
Elevator 0.723 ** 0.326 0.664 ** 0.310 0.727 ** 0.341
SRC −0.009 0.021 −0.012 0.022 −0.003 0.024
Skyscraper 0.072 0.045 0.067 0.045 0.057 0.044
Large-scale −0.033 0.043 −0.009 0.045 −0.018 0.045
Distance −0.010 *** 0.003 −0.010 *** 0.003 −0.010 *** 0.003
Constant 2.392 *** 0.451 1.870 *** 0.487 2.152 *** 0.595
Lag error 0.374 *** 0.090 0.381 *** 0.107 0.440 *** 0.111
Ward Yes Yes Yes
Train line Yes Yes Yes
Zoning Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes
Observations 599 599 599
Misspecification tests based on the OLS regression without Lag price
Spatial dependence tests Statistics P -value Statistics P -value Statistics P -value
LM lag 163.25 0.000 140.90 0.000 98.31 0.000
LM error 55.31 0.000 50.49 0.000 31.24 0.000
Robust LM lag 148.72 0.000 115.31 0.000 93.75 0.000
Robust LM error 40.78 0.000 24.90 0.000 26.68 0.000
Moran's I 9.28 0.000 8.61 0.000 8.10 0.000
Heteroskedastticity tests Statistics P -value Statistics P -value Statistics P -value
MS 20.87 0.000 24.34 0.000 20.21 0.000
Im 19.64 0.000 22.15 0.000 20.11 0.000
Normality tests Statistics P -value Statistics P -value Statistics P -value
Skewness 0.41 0.48 0.45
Kurtosis 3.70 3.54 3.51
JB 29.21 0.000 30.43 0.000 26.27 0.000
Adj JB 30.06 0.000 31.13 0.000 26.90 0.000
Note: ***, ** indicate significant at 1%, and 5%, respectively. 
Average number of the condominiums in the submarket: 56.7 in 2km; 176.9 in 4km; 437.8 in 8km. 
Table 4. Estimation results based on the revenue share (Ally 2). 
Dependent variable = log of Price
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
(a)
Lag price −0.008 0.014 0.185 *** 0.059 0.231 *** 0.076
Ally 1 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.007 *** 0.003
(b)
Lag price 0.006 0.015 0.190 *** 0.058 0.231 *** 0.072
Ally 2 0.002 *** 0.001 0.003 ** 0.001 0.007 *** 0.002
Notes: *** indicates significant at 1% and ** indicates significant at 5%. Number of observation is 599.
Average number of the condominiums in the submarket: 14.3 in 2km; 43.6 in 4km; 106.4 in 8km.
Table 6. Estimation results: Including JV sample.
Dependent variable = log of Price
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
(a)
Lag price 0.274 *** 0.043 0.325 *** 0.046 0.297 *** 0.057
Ally 1 0.001 0.001 0.004 ** 0.002 0.006 ** 0.003
(b)
Lag price 0.273 *** 0.043 0.316 *** 0.045 0.292 *** 0.056
Ally 2 0.002 *** 0.001 0.005 *** 0.001 0.007 *** 0.002
Note: *** indicates significant at 1% and ** indicates significant at 5%. Number of observations  is 709.
Average number of the condominiums in the submarket: 60.8 in 2km; 193.4 in 4km; 500.0 in 8km.
Table 7. Estimation results: Including JV sample as an independent developer.
Dependent variable = log of Price
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
(a)
Lag price 0.274 *** 0.044 0.318 *** 0.047 0.284 *** 0.058
Ally 1 0.001 0.001 0.007 *** 0.002 0.013 *** 0.004
(b)
Lag price 0.270 *** 0.044 0.314 *** 0.046 0.279 *** 0.057
Ally 2 0.002 *** 0.001 0.007 *** 0.002 0.012 *** 0.003
Notes: *** indicates significant at 1%. Number of observation is 709.
Average number of the condominiums in the submarket: 60.8 in 2km; 193.4 in 4km; 500.0 in 8km.
2km 4km 8km
Table 5. Estimation results based on the spatial weight matrix de fined 0 if properties are built in different
years.
2km 4km 8km
2 km 4 km 8 km
Note: Lines refer to the densities of the ally's share calculated using Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth is
equal to 4.57 for 2-kilometer radius, 2.61 for 4-kilometer radius, and 1.63 for 8-kilometer radius,
respectively.
Figure 1. The densities of the ally's share (Ally 1).
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